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sides. Thus, the prosecution, upon whom the burden of proof rests, will
not be able to sustain that burden, and some prisoners who should remain
incarcerated will be freed.
On the other hand, the convict innocent of a succeeding conviction
would be in the unenviable position of helpless inaction while watching
witnesses and other evidence which might free him pass out of his grasp.
Perhaps this is one of the reasons for the seriousness of the crimes in
which habeas corpus has been granted, and the almost total absence of
lesser offenses from habeas corpus reports.2" Justice Cohen feels that the
majority decision merely shifts the burden to already overloaded prose-
cutors. This, however, is a small price to pay for a determination which
will have to be made anyway, and which, if made presently, will protect
the interests of both the state and the individual.
A consideration of the basis of the decision leads to the conclusion that
the holding of the court is a wise one. Historically, conditions have
changed radically, so that the common law writ of habeas corpus must
fulfill a different, expanded function from that which it served at earlier
common law. The impact of the recent constitutional decisions was the
final drastic change which urgently called out for some procedural vehicle
by which a convict could assert alleged violations of his rights. And the
prejudice which results from disappearance of evidence under the pre-
maturity concept is a pressing consideration. In short, the decision of the
court is the necessary and logical outgrowth of historical development and
the present relationship which exists between the state and the federal
courts.
John L. Gedid
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE-Pennsylvania statute that authorizes a
jury to impose costs on an acquitted misdemeanor defendant and subjects
him to imprisonment for failure to pay such costs is invalid under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Giaccio v. State of Pennsylvania, 86 Sup. Ct. 518 (1966).
In the recent case of Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,1 the United States Supreme
Court outlawed the "Scotch verdict" practice in Pennsylvania criminal
proceedings. This practice permitted a jury to impose the costs of prosecu-
tion on a defendant found not guilty of the substantive charge against him.
26. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus, 108 U. PA. L. Rav. 461, 484 (1960). Prof. Reitz feels
that this is very probably the reason. In his study of thirty-five federal cases in which
habeas corpus was granted, the median sentence was twenty-five years.
1. 86 Sup. Ct. 518 (1966).
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RECENT DECISIONS
Prior to Giaccio, Pennsylvania stood alone among the states as the exactor
of tribute from unfortunate acquitted defendants.2
Petitioner Giaccio was charged with the misdemeanor of wantonly
pointing and discharging a firearm.' At trial the petitioner's defense was
that the firearm he had discharged was a starter pistol that fired only
blanks. A jury acquitted the petitioner, but imposed the costs of his
prosecution on him pursuant to a Pennsylvania statute of 1860.' The
petitioner objected to the imposition of such costs, claiming that the Act
of 1860 was unconstitutionally vague and lacking in standards in violation
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.5 The trial court
agreed, holding the Act void for vagueness, and vacated the petitioner's
sentence.' The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed and reinstated
the sentence.' The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment
of the Superior Court.' On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the judgment against the petitioner, holding the
Act of 1860 unconstitutional under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.' The majority, speaking through Mr. Justice Black,
declared that "the 1860 Act is invalid under the Due Process Clause
because of vagueness and the absence of any standards sufficient to enable
defendants to protect themselves against arbitrary and discriminatory
impositions of costs."' 0 Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring; argued that "it
is enough for me that Pennsylvania allows a jury to punish a defendant
2. The trial court summarized: ."Apparently the practice never existed at the English
common law, and, so far as we can determine, it does not exist in any other State of the
United States. It is specifically condemned in the Constitutions of Florida, North Carolina
and Mississippi, .... The courts of four other States have indicated the costs should not be
imposed on acquitted defendants. Cf. Arnold v. State, 76 Wyo. 445, 306 P.2d 368; Childers
v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 456; State v. Brooks, 33 Kan. 708; Biester v. State, 65 Neb. 276,
91 N.W. 416." Commonwealth v. Giaccio, 30 D. & C.2d 463, 470 (1963).
3. Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 716; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4716.
4. Act of March 31, 1860, P.L. 427, § 62; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1222. The Act of
1860 provides in pertinent part:
• . . in all cases of acquittals by the petit jury on indictments for [offenses other
than felonies], the jury trying the same shall determine, by their verdict, whether
the county, or the prosecutor, or the defendant shall pay the costs . . . and when-
ever the jury shall determine as aforesaid, that the . . . defendant shall pay the costs,
the court in which the said determination shall be made shall forthwith pass
sentence to that effect, and order him to be committed to the jail of the county
until the costs are paid, unless he give security to pay the same within ten days.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Petitioner's challenge that the Act of 1860 violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment was not reached or decided by the
Court. Giaccio v. State of Pennsylvania, supra note 1, at 520 n.3.
6. Commonwealth v. Giaccio, 30 D. & C.2d 463 (1963).
7. Commonwealth v. Giaccio, 202 Pa. Super. 294, 196 A.2d 189 (1963).
8. Commonwealth v. Giaccio, 415 Pa. 139, 202 A.2d 55 (1964).
9. Commonwealth v. Giaccio, supra note 1.
10. Id. at 520.
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after finding him not guilty. That, I think, violates the most rudimentary
concept of due process of law.""
The Court began its opinion with a discussion of the state court inter-
pretations of the Act of 1860. These decisions relied on the premise that
the Act was "not a penal statute" but one of a "civil character."' 2 The
Court reasoned, however, that regardless of label, the Act of 1860 operated
to deprive an acquitted defendant of his liberty and property. Thus the
Court found that the Act must stand the test of the petitioner's challenge
that it was unconstitutionally vague. 13 Considering the issue of vagueness,
the Court, citing Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey 4 and Baggett v.
Bullitt,15 said:
a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process
Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public
uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and
jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is
prohibited and what is not in each particular case .... 16
The Court continued:
The 1860 Pennsylvania Act contains no standards at all, nor
does it place any conditions of any kind upon the jury's power to
impose costs upon a defendant who has been found by the jury
to be not guilty of a crime charged against him. (Emphasis
added.)'7
The Commonwealth's contention that even if the Act of 1860, as originally
written, had been void for vagueness, subsequent state court interpreta-
tions have cured its former constitutional deficiencies, was rejected. The
Court noted that in the instant case, although the trial court's charge 8
provided the court and jury with some standards to follow, it nonetheless
failed to conform to the demands of due process. The Court further
emphasized the difficulties a defendant would find himself in when sub-
jected to such undefinable charges as "misconduct" or "reprehensible
conduct."19
11. Id. at 522. Mr. Justice Fortas concurred on the same ground.
12. Id. at 518.
13. Ibid.
14. 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
15. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
16. Commonwealth v. Giaccio, supra note 1, at 518-19.
17. Id. at 519.
18. The trial judge charged the jury that it might place the costs of prosecution on the
petitioner though not found guilty of the crime charged, if the jury found that "he has been
guilty of some misconduct less than the offense which is charged but nevertheless mis-
conduct of some kind as a result of which he should be required to pay some penalty short
of conviction [and] . . . his misconduct has given rise to the prosecution."
19. These terms appear in a number of state court cases. See e.g., Baldwin v. Common-
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The Supreme Court's decision in Giaccio offers a deserved reprimand
to a practice of criminal practice conceived in obscurity. The imputation
of criminal conduct where none has been found to exist, only serves to
promote judicial hypocrisy. Thus the decision by the Supreme Court
marks the demise of a legislative and court created "quasi-crime." 20 It is
no longer possible for a Pennsylvania jury to impose costs on an acquitted
defendant "as a deserved rebuke, admonition or penalty for conduct not
sufficient to warrant a conviction."'" Yet the Giaccio decision does raise
a question of future jury reaction in cases involving first offenders. A
verdict of "not guilty and pay the costs" plus the silent admonition, "but
don't do it again"22 has in the past permitted first offenders to avoid the
stain of a criminal record. But, whether jurors will continue to allow a
first offender a second chance, absent the silent admonition, remains to be
seen. In this regard, the problems of the administration of criminal
justice in a system limited by the requirements of due process illustrate
the need for a pragmatic approach to the first offender issue. The aims
of the criminal law must be redirected from within the legal system to
accommodate both the demands of punishment and those of fundamental
fairness as correctional devices.
John F. Naughton
CoNTR1cTs-Signature on Instrument-The traditional view that one is
bound by his signature may be in jeopardy in Pennsylvania.
Herman v. Stern, 419 Pa. 272, 213 A.2d 594 (1965).
In a recent decision,' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, after discussing
at great length many unnecessary and irrelevant factors, with one Justice
concurring and three Justices dissenting, adhered to a basic principle of
contract law. It appears, from this case, that only a plurality of the court
is willing to hold that one is bound by what he signs. Others on the court,
without even mentioning this rule, seemed to be calling for a principle
which would in fact destroy this traditional view.
Richard B. Herman, a real estate broker, brought this action for a
commission allegedly earned through the sale of some real estate owned
by the defendant; James L. Stern. John J. Shaw, Jr., then lessee of the
premises in question, engaged the plaintiff, Herman, late in 1959 to find
a subtenant for the unexpired term of his lease.2 Herman found a sub-
wealth, 26 Pa. 171 (1856); Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 4 S. & R. 127 (Pa. 1818); Common-
wealth v. Giaccio, supra note 7.
20. See Commonwealth v. Donovan, 119 Pa. Super. 544, 181 At. 606 (1935).
21. Commonwealth v. Meany, 8 Pa. Super. 224, 226 (1898).
22. Commonwealth v. Giaccio, supra note 7, at 147, 202 A.2d at 60.
1. Herman v. Stern, 419 Pa. 272, 213 A.2d 594 (1965).
2. The term was not to expire until August 31, 1960.
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